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This essay considers the circumstances of persons deprived of their liberty in the context 
of Covid-19. Detention is always intended to be exceptional and the essay explores the 
extent to which the pandemic impacts upon this exceptional character. First, by increasing 
ison sentences, to what extent 
should Covid-19 serve as a justification for early release or commutation of punishment? 
In this respect, should the goals of retribution and specific and general deterrence be 
weighed against the rights to health and safety of prisoners and prison staff, and if so, 
how? Do detaining authorities have absolute discretion to determine which detainees to 
release or must they ensure that policies of release also, are not arbitrary? To what extent 
does the arbitrary resort to detention as well as the arbitrary decision to maintain someone 
disease and thereby produce extreme anxiety, give rise to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, if not torture?  
 
The paper considers how governments, specialist agencies and courts are beginning to 
grapple with these legal, ethical and public health issues. On the one hand, recognition of 
the heightened health risks for detainees associated with the pandemic is proving to be an 
important opportunity to reduce reliance on detention  and thereby to make good on the 
intention for detention to be recognised as an exceptional measure. Yet on the other hand, 
as will be shown, the selectivity of approaches and lack of transparency and oversight of 
decision-making has put some detainees at even greater risk of harm.   
 
 
I. Introduction: A Brief Roadmap 
 
This essay starts by considering the various contexts of detention. It then reviews the 
-19. It does so by 
considering a range of pandemic-related circumstances that can heighten the arbitrariness 
of detention. It also considers how Covid-19-inspired releases from detention, whether 
they are temporary releases or permanent commutations of sentences, may also 
contribute to arbitrariness.    
 
The pandemic also contributes to other rights issues associated with detention. Indeed, 
the use of quarantines and protective detention have featured regularly in Covid-19 
responses. Also, persons who ignore emergency regulations may be prosecuted, and in 
that context may be detained. The potential over-reach of emergency provisions, 
discriminatory impacts and/or the ways in which the restrictions put in place have been 
balanced with other rights, particularly for the most vulnerable in our societies, are all topics 
worthy of detailed consideration.1 Notwithstanding their importance, these aspects are not 
the focus of this essay. The essay focuses on how responses to Covid-19 are impacting 
1 
deprivation of liberty in the context of public hea  
persons who are already detained or at risk of detention for reasons unconnected to the 
pandemic. 
 
II. Places of Confinement: Positive Obligations in a State of Hyper-Engagement 
 
Places of confinement are particularly dangerous for the spread of infectious diseases. 
This is regardless of whether they are prisons, police stations, hospitals, drug rehabilitation 
centres, ships, residential care homes, transit zones, refugee and migrant detention or 
removal centres or closed refugee or displaced persons camps. It is also irrespective of 
whether the goals of the places of confinement are to care for or protect the inhabitants, to 
respond to emergencies or to serve as some form of rehabilitation or punishment. The 
dangers associated with places of confinement stem from the large number of persons 
forced to live in close proximity to one another and the inability to practice effective social 
distancing measures and hygiene best practise. Also, the heightened risks stem from the 
vulnerability of many individuals within some detainee populations on account of their 
underlying health statuses and/or their experience of different forms of marginalisation, 
taken together with often poor ventilation, challenging sanitation conditions, limited space 
and insufficient access to doctors and medical supplies. Consequently, detainees as well 
as those working in detention settings face a disproportionately high risk of infection as 
well as a higher mortality rate.  
 
Given the lack of autonomy within detention settings, detainees are reliant on those 
responsible for their detention to address both proactively and reactively, their health, 
safety and related needs. This reliance exists at all times but is accentuated in the time of 
a pandemic given the special health risks. The reliance heightens detai
which in turn means that any acts or omissions of the authorities are likely to have a greater 
-being on account of the feelings of powerlessness 
they engender. Arguably, it also means that detaining authorities have a heightened or 
special duty of care to those they detain,2 which because of the greater risks of infection 
and higher mortality rates associated with the pandemic in detention, goes beyond the 
general duty of care recognised in the Mandela Rules to provide to detainees (irrespective 
of citizenship, nationality or migration status) the same level of care inside detention as is 
available outside in the community.3 The special duty of care will be breached if detention 
conditions and the policies relating to detention do not take adequate account of the 
specific contexts of detention and the special risks posed by Covid-19, and tailor services 
and measures to adequately protect against the disease.  
 
diligence, is one of means rather than result, however it is context-specific; it is focused on 
the reasonable steps detaining authorities must take in light of the specific and heightened 
risks posed by the pandemic in places of confinement, in terms of protective gear for staff; 
testing for detainees at the time of admission; ventilation and general air quality; hand 
sanitisers; and measures to improve physical distancing. Because of the nature and 
2 UN Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 36, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36, 30 October 2018, 
paras. 6, 25. See also, Rowson v Department of Justice and Community Safety [2020] VSC 236, 1 May 2020, 
Supreme Court rules Victorian Government prima facie breached 




protect detainees and staff operating in places of confinement extends beyond the right to 
liberty and security of the person, to the rights to life, freedom from torture and other cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, health, to be treated with humanity and 
with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, and an array of other rights. 
These rights are not simply engaged  -
 
 
III. The Exceptional Nature of Detention 
 
The right to liberty and security of the person is a fundamental principle of human rights 
law recognised by numerous international and regional treaties, case law and national 
constitutions.4 While there will be circumstances when detention is appropriate, it is always 
 
 
No detention that is arbitrary can ever be regarded as lawful;5 though the parameters of 
arbitrary if it is ordered outside of any law, or if it involves an unfair or improper procedure,6 
a degree of inappropriateness, injustice or unpredictability.7 Examples of arbitrary 
detention include: indefinite or unduly prolonged administrative detention; automatic 
pretrial or administrative detention without review; if there is no possibility to review the 
legality of the detention within a reasonable time from the detention and at regular periodic 
intervals thereafter; if it results from discrimination against a protected group or from an 
individual or group seeking to exercise freedom of expression or association.8  
 
In order for a detention to be lawful, the detention must be on grounds and in accordance 
with a procedure prescribed by law.9 Potential examples, which would depend on the facts 
in any given case, include: if a person has been found guilty of a crime and sentenced to 
a term of imprisonment; to prevent the commission of a crime; when someone presents a 
risk of absconding from future legal proceedings or administrative processes or presents 
a danger to their own or public security. Other reasons may relate to the mental health of 
the person which may make it necessary to detain them for their own protection or 
protection of others.10  
 
Beyond this, any decision to detain must be made on the basis of and in accordance with 
such procedures as are established by law, and the law itself must be appropriate, 
accessible, sufficiently precise, consistently applied and predictable.11 Equally, the 
detention must be for a legitimate purpose and must be necessary and proportionate - 
there must be no lesser means available to achieve the objective justifying 
4 Art 9 UDHR; Art 9 ICCPR; Art 5 ECHR; Art 6 Banjul Charter; Art 7 ACHR. 
5 Winterwerp v. The Netherlands Appl No. 6301/73, 24 October 1979, para. 39. 
6 Ibid, para. 45. See also, Kemmache v. France (No. 3), Appl No. 17621/91, 24 November 1994, para. 37. 
7 Mukong v. Cameroon, Case No. 458/1991, UN Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991, 21 July 1994, para. 9.8. 
See also, Gangaram Panday v. Suriname (Merits, reparations, and costs), Series C No. 16, 21 January 
1994, para. 47. 
8 
2/44, 24 December 2012. 
99 Art 9(1) ICCPR. 
10 Art 5(1) ECHR. 
11 Mukong v. Cameroon (n. 7), para. 9.8; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (Grand Chamber), Appl. No. 
16483/12, 15 December 2016, para. 92. See also, WGAD, Deliberation No. 11 (n. 1), para. 10. 
detention.12 Furthermore, detention must be of a limited duration and must be applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner. 
 
Inadequate conditions of detention may make detention arbitrary. This is because the 
conditions can impede detainees from exercising crucial rights. The UN Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) has explained that pre-trial detainees who endure detention 
conditions that affect health, safety or well-being, or who have none or insufficient access 
to counsel or others, will participate in criminal proceedings in less favourable conditions 
than the prosecution, impairing the prospect for a fair trial. Sometimes, conditions will be 
-incrimination, or - even worse - to make pre-
trial detention a form of advance punishment in violation of the presumption of 
13 
 
IV. Does Covid-19 Impact on Exceptionality in Detention? 
 
a) Covid-19 and conditions of detention 
 
It has been recognised that detainees must be held in conditions that are compatible with 
respect for their human dignity, that they are not subjected to distress or hardship that goes 
beyond the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical 
demands of imprisonment, their health and well-being are adequately secured.14 At times, 
conditions of detention will be so deficient that they will cause severe pain or suffering that 
may rise to the level of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, if not torture. 
Severe overcrowding can amount to prohibited ill-treatment15 on account of the distress or 
hardship it engenders, for example by being 
16 It is not difficult to extend this logic to detainees 
who fear the spread of Covid-19 because of inadequate sanitation, poor ventilation, lack 
of protective gear for staff entering and exiting facilities and inadequate testing and medical 
care.   
 
Detention authorities have taken measures to reduce the risk of Covid-19 spreading. Some 
measures have to do with releases, discussed in the next section (b). Other measures 
have to do with improving sanitation, increasing social distancing within detention facilities 
(through solitary cell confinement; reducing exercise and other mingling between 
detainees) and prohibiting or severely restricting access to outside visits. There is a 
question whether these measures are sufficient or appropriate in the circumstances in light 
measures taken may increase the risk of arbitrariness. This is because of the arbitrary way 
in which decisions tend to be taken. For example, the lack of transparency with respect to 
who may be temporarily released as a social distancing measure and who may be 
subjected to new/additional restrictions on movement within places of confinement; as well 
as the failure for detaining authorities to consider adequately the impact on particularly 
vulnerable detainees of the removal of privileges (which tend to increase isolation within 
detention settings as well as vulnerability). 
12 Saadi v. the United Kingdom (Grand Chamber), Appl. No. 13229/03, 29 January 2008, paras. 68-74. 
13 
2004, paras. 69, 70. 
14 Ramirez Sanchez v. France (Grand Chamber), Appl. No. 59450/00, 4 July 2006, para. 119. 
15 Kalashnikov v. Russia, Appl. No. 47095/99, 15 July 2002, paras. 96-97.  
16 Khudoyorov v. Russia, Appl. No. 6847/02, 8 November 2005, para 107. 
 
Detainees must receive appropriate medical treatment, and where needed, psychological 
counselling. Detaining authorities have a positive obligation to prevent the spread of 
contagious disease, and must introduce appropriate measures, such as screening 
detainees upon admission and prompt and effective treatment programmes.17 The 
European Court of Human Rights has recognised that the failure to diagnose and provide 
adequate medical care to detainees can amount to ill-treatment;18 lack of treatment 
resulting in death also violates the right to life.19 In Gladkiy v. Russia, it determined that, 
20  
 
In an effort to increase social distancing, many institutions have severely restricted or even 
eliminated outside visits, including from families and lawyers. Similarly, independent 
detention monitoring and oversight bodies which are crucial to help stop abuse and 
inadequate prison conditions, have been placed on hold, increasing detainee vulnerability, 
isolation, fears and anxieties. Reportedly, one woman at HMP Downview prison in Surrey, 
United Kingdom, has alerted the United Nations to a breach of her human rights, because 
she has been locked in her cell for 23 hours a day -  measure taken by the facility to reduce 
the likelihood of spread of the disease.21 It is important as some policy bodies have 
must be necessary, time-bound and proportionate. 
However, the most critical is the combined effect of a series of limitations which together 
create a dangerous vacuum, disproportionately impacting the legal protection of detainees 
22 The WGAD has recognised that the 
introduction of blanket measures restricting access to courts and legal counsel cannot be 
23 
must ensure the availability of other ways for legal counsel to communicate with their 
clients, including secured online communication or communication over the telephone, free 
of charge and in circumstances in which privileged and confidential discussions can take 
24  
 
b) Covid-19 and Justifications for Early Release 
 
The rules to determine whether a particular detention is arbitrary have not changed 
because of the pandemic. It is still necessary to consider whether the detention was subject 
to law, whether the law itself was just and appropriate, and whether the detention was 
necessary and proportionate to fulfil a legitimate purpose.  However, the factors to take 
into account when determining whether detention was necessary and proportionate have 
certainly changed and the pandemic may change the outcome of such considerations. 
17 Poghosyan v. Georgia, Appl. No. 9870/07, 24 February 2009, para. 69, 70. 
18 Khudobin v. Russia, Applic. No. 59696/00, 26 October 2006, paras 94  96. See also, Asyukov v. 
Russia, Applic. No. 2974/05, 5 April 2011, para. 76. 
19 Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine, Applic. No. 28005/08, 14 March 2013.    
20  Gladkiy v. Russia, Applic. No. 3242/03, 21 December 2010, para. 96. 
21 
Sky News, 11 June 2020. 
22 -19 and Detention: OMCT Guidance brief to the SOS-Torture 
 
23 WGAD, Deliberation No. 11 (n. 1), para. 21. 
24 Ibid. See also, Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) of OHCHR 
COVID-
 
Certain detentions which would otherwise satisfy necessity and proportionality 
requirements may no longer do so, given the disproportionately high risk of infection in 
detention and higher mortality rate. Consequently, it is necessary to assess whether, in 
light of the change in circumstances occasioned by the pandemic, continued detention is 
still justified in each detained case or class of cases.25 The failure to do so increases the 
arbitrariness of detention b
considered as part of a review of the legality of their detention. 
 
Proportionality and necessity requirements may have changed as a result of Covid-19. 
First, proportionality requires some comparison between the detention and the purpose it 
is intended to achieve. Purposes will differ depending on the type of detention. The 
purpose of pre-trial detention is to ensure defendants appear at trial and the safety of 
accused and/or the public whereas the purpose of sentencing is to ensure the various 
crime control punishment rationales (e.g., specific and general deterrence; retribution; 
rehabilitation). In other settings, purposes include to ensure physical or psychological care 
and protection in hospital and care settings; to ensure attendance at future legal 
proceedings or administrative processes for migrant and refugee processing or removal 
centres. These various purposes may change over time,26 and sometimes, Covid-19 may 
render the purposes no longer justifiable. For instance, it may not be justifiable to detain a 
failed asylum seeker to await deportation,  when deportation to the country of origin is not 
an option because that country is not expecting to accept entrants within a reasonable 
time, because of Covid-19.27 But also, the costs associated with detention are augmented 
by Covid-19, arguably shifting the balance. As an example, pre-trial detention may be 
harder to justify if trials in a particular country have been put on hold because of the 
pandemic. emand and 
sentenced prisoners alike are being held in conditions amounting to solitary confinement, 
for extended periods as they await trials that have invariably been delayed. Nothing has 
28    
 
Secondly, necessity is focussed on whether there are realistic alternatives to detention. 
Here, the negatives associated with detention during Covid-19 are augmented, but the 
alternatives to detention will also have been affected; due to lockdowns, there may be 
fewer available half-way houses or less temporary accommodation; community 
programmes to help integrate released detainees may not be operational and parole 
systems may be dysfunctional.29 
families can also create difficulties and tensions with little time to prepare for release and 
appropriate post-release monitoring or support. There may also be detainees without clear 
places to go to, including foreigners, migrants, children or women defenders whose family 
30  
 
Releases, whether permanent or temporary, help underscore that detention should be 
exceptional, and particularly so in the context of a pandemic. Releases encourage 
detaining authorities and policymakers to consider alternatives to detention. These could 
25 Challenging immigration detention in the COVID-19 pandem  
26 Murray v. the Netherlands (Grand Chamber), Appl. No. 10511/10, 26 April 2016, para. 100. 
27 Ibid. See also, R v Governor of Durham Prison ex parte Hardial Singh[1984] 1 WLR 704. 
28 -  
29 Ibid. 
30 OMCT (n. 22). 
be applied to short-term pandemic needs, but might in the longer term be incorporated as 
standard alternatives to detention.  
 
Nevertheless, release is another area where an absence of clear rules transparently 
implemented may result in arbitrariness, particularly if there is no clear procedure for 
detainees to petition to have their cases considered. The jurisprudence on the reducibility 
of life sentences is relevant, where the European Court of Human Rights has found a 
assess 
whether continued imprisonment is justified on legitimate penolo  Nor did it 
-frame in which the President must decide on the clemency application or 
to oblige him or the Minister of Justice  to give reasons for the 31 Covid-19 
releases which are undertaken without transparency or without a clear framework can also 
result in those who remain in detention feeling as if they are being doubly punished.  
 
Many oversight bodies have recommended who should be prioritised for release.32 The 
recommendations tend to focus on factors connected, first, to the rationale for the detention 
(e.g., persons unlawfully or arbitrarily detained should be released, as should the bulk of 
pre-trial detainees; persons held for non-penal reasons such as immigration detainees).33 
measure of last resort, which is a particularly high threshold to be satisfied in the context 
34 However, some of the major refugee 
receiving countries have been slow to implement releases, with dangerous consequences. 
Arguably migrants are the equivalent in terms of the derision they receive to the human 
rights defenders and protest movements operating in the most repressive regimes. At the 
vulnerable migrants detained in its wide network of immigration detention centres.35  
 
Other factors taken into account include whether persons pose a danger to society 
(prisoners serving short prison sentences for non-violent crimes; prisoners who are almost 
at the end of their prison term).36 States have begun to take on board some of these 
recommendations, leading to an important number of temporary and permanent releases 
in many countries. However, there are some important gaps. Many countries that routinely 
resort to arbitrary detention, particularly against protest movements, opposition groups, 
human rights defenders and journalists, have failed to proceed with their releases. At 
times, this is because the individuals concerned have been charged and at times convicted 
of security-related offences, which have been classified as some of the most serious 
offences not subject to full or conditional release.37 At other times, it is because the state 
has introduced arbitrariness into the release process, picking and choosing who should 
benefit from this solution. For instance, it has been reported that in the context of the 
pandemic, Turkey introduced legislation to secure the release of up to 100,000 prisoners, 
31 T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary, Apps. 37871/14, 73986/14, 4 October 2016, para. 49. See also, 
and others v. Lithuania, Apps. No. 22662/13, 51059/13, 58823/13, 23 May 2017, 157-181. 
32 -19 and Protection of right 
-19 Human Rights Dispatch No. 2, 5 May 2020.  
33 IASC (n. 24); see also, WGAD, Deliberation No. 11 (n. 1). 
34 WGAD, Deliberation No. 11 (n. 1), para. 23. 
35 -19 in 
The Guardian, 12 May 2020. 
36 See, e.g., the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (CPT) in its COVID-19 Statement of Principles; IASC (n. 24).  
37 OMCT (n. 22). 
but detained journalists and human rights activists are not included.38 Similarly, Israel has 
announced the release of thousands of Israeli prisoners, including serious offenders. 
However, reportedly, it has failed to release Palestinian prisoners, even the minors, 
women, the elderly and infirm.39 In Egypt, thousands of prisoners have been pardoned but 
report 40 For those forced to remain 
in detention it is a double punishment; arbitrarily detained and now condemned to 
anxiously await infection.  
  
Also, there is an emphasis on different forms of vulnerability, which focuses on categories 
such as persons over a certain age, pregnant women and women who are breastfeeding, 
persons with underlying health conditions, and persons with disabilities, as well as children 
and women with children.41 Who is considered vulnerable, and relative levels of 
vulnerability, particularly if connected to disease susceptibility, is highly contested as the 
disease is not yet fully understood. Also, assessments of vulnerability can ignore or 
undervalue complex, intersecting vulnerabilities. Invariably, considerations of who should 
be released on account of their vulnerability will involve both ethics and science, and also 
some consideration of human rights. It is important that decisions to release are taken on 
clear and transparent grounds that are non-discriminatory.  
 
In respect of persons serving out sentences of imprisonment for crimes committed, to what 
extent should Covid-19 serve as a justification for early release or commutation of 
sentence? In this respect, should the goals of retribution and specific and general 
deterrence be weighed against the right to health and safety of prisoners and prison staff, 
and, if so, how? A number of elderly and potentially frail convicted war criminals have been 
temporarily released from detention, on vulnerability considerations. Penological 
considerations such as retribution or rehabilitation have not been major considerations for 
the release, particularly as they are intended to be temporary releases. These include 
Hissène Habré, who was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Extraordinary African 
Chambers seated in Senegal, for the torture and crimes against humanity he directly 
perpetrated and oversaw in Chad, has been given a two month leave from prison (to house 
arrest) as a consequence of the Covid-19 risks.42 
expressed deep concern, given the failure to progress their reparations awards; all the 
43 Many convicted war criminals have been 
seeking release around the world.44 The human rights community has struggled with its 
38 Emma Sinclair-  
Beyond Turkey, Human Rights Watch has reported that key human rights defenders remain in detention 
despite national release programmes making progress with other detainee groups in Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, 
Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Cambodia, Cameroon, Libya, South Sudan, Syria, Yemen and China. See, HRW, 
-  
39 COVID-19 and Human Rights  
human rights  
40 No political prisoners freed as Egypt pardons thousands on Eid: President el-Sisi grants clemency to 
3,157 people, including ex- Al Jazeera, 24 May 
2020. 
41 E.g., WGAD, Deliberation No. 11 (n. 1), para. 15, 16; See also IASC (n. 24). 
42 -president temporarily released from jail due to COVID-  
43 COVID-19: 
16 April 2020. 
44 See, e.g., Jo- -19 Puts Justice on Hold, Emboldening Convicted War 
-ICT Urges 
President of the UN International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals to Urgently Grant Early or 
Provisional Release to Detainees in Light of the COVID-  
response to such releases. The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, 
reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence has issued guidance on this issue, noting 
the legitimate and necessary measures to protect against Covid-19 and overcrowding 
should not lead, de jure or de facto, to impunity for persons convicted in various parts of 
the world for serious violations of human rights, crimes against humanity, genocide, or war 
ld only be afforded if it is 
impossible to relocate such prisoner to a prison facility with safe and healthy conditions.45 
OMCT has taken a more direct line, recommending to the organizations in its network that 
we should avoid advocating for the potential release of war criminals, those convicted of 
crimes against humanity, genocide or the crime of torture, whose prosecutions many of us 
46 But this presents an arbitrary exception to the application of vulnerability 
criteria, which cannot be right.  
 
IV. Conclusions: An Increase or Reduction in Arbitrariness? 
 
We know that there is a prohibition of arbitrary detention. However, as has been described, 
Covid-19 can accentuate the arbitrariness of detention in several important ways. First, 
detention may no longer satisfy the tests of proportionality and necessity. Second, 
inadequate prison conditions, including poor health and sanitation as well as distancing 
measures which isolate detainees for their own health and safety, but fail to provide 
reasonable accommodation, can also make the detention arbitrary given the impact such 
conditions have on the ability of detainees to exercise their rights. Detention in the context 
of Covid-19 can also heighten the arbitrariness associated with a number of other human 
rights violations.47 
 
Also, arbitrariness can enter into decisions to release detainees as part of distancing 
measures. Lack of clarity, fairness and transparency in decisions to release contributes to 
arbitrariness and increases the stress and anxiety of detainees and their families, which 
constitutes a double punishment which they do not deserve, this time cruel, inhuman or 




45 UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Killings (n. 32). 
46 OMCT (n. 22), p. 5. 
47 UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Killings (n. 32).  
